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Some observers have argued that high technology in-
dustries are leaving early technology centers, such as
Silicon Valley, for lower-cost locations. These assertions
areconsistentwith a worldin whichearly innovationstend
to be concentrated geographically, but proximity to the
innovating region becomes less important than othercosts
as the product's market grows and standardizedproduc-
tion technologies are developed.
This study finds little evidence of such patterns in
electroniccomponentsactivity within the U.S.In contrast,
the U.S. share ofthe total worldwide electronics market
hasfallendramatically, while nations with lowercostsand
less developed technological infrastructures are gaining
market share.
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During the 1980s, some observers argued that high
technology industries were leaving early technology cen-
ters, such as Silicon Valley, for lower-cost locations in the
U.S. and abroad (see, for example, Saxenian 1984).These
assertions are consistent with the views of some econo-
mists, who believe that the factors affecting firms' location
decisions may vary during the course of a product's life
cycle (Vernon1966).In this view,innovationin aparticular
industry tends to be concentrated in a region that offers
access to technological expertise, evenifthe general level
ofcosts in that region is relatively high. As the market for
the new product grows and standardized production tech-
nologies are developed, proximity to the innovating region
becomes less important, freeing firms to seek lower land
and labor costs elsewhere. Thus, according to this theory,
infant industries may be concentratedin high cost regions,
while mature industries are more likelyto belocated where
production costs are low.
Previous studies addressing similar issues (Malecki
1985, Park and Lewis 1991)found that geographicaldisper-
siondid notoccurwithin thetechnology-oriented industries
they studied. However, these results are not necessarily
inconsistent with Vernon's hypothesis. First, they looked
only atchanges within theU.S. Vernon's paper, incontrast,
discussedthese changes in aninternationalcontext, andthe
forces suggested by his theory may be more readily appar-
ent by making international comparisons.
Second, they looked for "dispersion," defined as an
even distribution of activity across all geographic areas.
However, a search for low-cost production sites would not
result in anevendistribution of productionacross localities
ifproductionmoved enmasse to aregion thatoffered lower
land and labor costs. Thus, the level of geographic con-
centrationin theindustrycould remain constant, evenif the
location of that concentration were to change. In addition,
the geographic areas used for previous studies (census
regions and states) may be too large to capture someofthe
changes that do occur.
An alternative explanation for the empirical studies'
results is that the productlife cycle theory may not hold for
high-techindustries. One possible reason is that thepace of
25innovation has been so rapid that many products havelife-
spans of only a few years. In this dynamic environment,
the investments in standardizedproduction technologythat
allow production to move away from the innovation site
may never be economically feasible. Moreover, the fre-
quent changes mean that an "industry" as defined by data
classifications does not describe a single homogeneous
product, but instead includes a series of several distinct
products, which substitute for each other over time.
This studyexamines the issuesraised byVernon'stheory
in the context of the electronic components industry. The
paper is organized as follows. The first section discusses
the factors thatcould cause firms' location decision param-
eters to change over the course of a product's life cycle.
SectionII addresses whether the changes described by the
product life cycle theory have occurred internationally.
Section III addresses the same question within the U.S.,
using more detailed U.S. data and defining the questions
somewhat differently from previous U.S. studies. Section
IV draws conclusions.
I. THE PRODUCTLIFE CYCLE
Vernon (1966)provided a rationale for why firms' loca-
tion decisions might change during the course of a prod-
uct's life cycle. Like many stage theories, the stages
themselves are somewhat arbitrary, and the events of one
stage do not provide a compelling explanation of why
events ought toprogress to the next stage. Nevertheless, its
majorpoints areboth plausible and consistent withpopular
notions of the changes that have occurred in high technol-
ogy industries. Moreover, it provides a convenient frame-
work for a more general discussion of the changes in the
industry's structure.
Initially, production might be concentrated geograph-
ically simply because each innovation must take place
somewhere. However, some regions are more likely to be
seedbeds for innovations than others, since a critical mass
of related activity can yield external economies of scale
that make each input more productive. For example, a
region with a cluster of related activities is likely to have
thebusiness service and financial infrastructure in placeto
serve firms with similar needs. Moreover, workers with
appropriate skills are likely to bemore plentiful in such a
location, and if these skills are relatively unusual in the
general population, the location will be particularly ap-
pealing to firms. For innovations in which work force
characteristics and local infrastructure are critical, prox-
imityto these factors is likelyto outweigh other considera-
tions in firms' location decisions at the innovation stage.
Therefore, during the innovation stage a cluster of activity
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could occur even in a location where the general level of
costs is high.
After the initial innovation comes a transition stage, in
which increaseddemand forthe productmakes investment
in production technology feasible and the technology of
production can be transferred from one location to another.
At this point, firms are not tied.to the site of the original
innovation as closely as they were in the first stage.
Nevertheless, the continued need for technological exper-
tise as the production process is refined may lead the firm
to confine its site search to a smaller region than it might
otherwise explore. Thus, in this second stage, the industry
may spread out somewhat from its initial concentration of
activity.
The third and final stage of the product life cycle. is
standardization. In principle, standardization occurs when
technological innovations are complete, so the research
activities that previously were concentrated in the innovat-
ing region are no longer necessary. In practice, some
technological inputs may be required even when produc-
tion is relatively standardized, but in any case, sitelocation
decisions should be based primarily on the costs of inputs
to a standardized production process. Most interregional
cost differences would be expected to result from dif-
ferences in land and labor costs.
Ifpatterns in the electronic components industry were
consistent with the product .life cycle theory, and if the
initial activity were concentrated in high-cost areas, ac-
tivity should have left the regions where early innovations
took place, and currentactivity should be most prevalentin
areas that offer low levels of production costs for the
industry. Wages and other direct costs should havebecome
more important locational determinants over time, while
attributes associated with technological expertise should
have become less important. These trends should have
been especially prevalent in the line production activities,
which would require relatively little technological exper-
tise if theywere standardized. Moreover,if the product life
cycle theory accurately describes changes in the electronic
components industry, research and production activities
should have become less closely linked to each other over
time.
In some ways,thesekinds of changes seem plausible for
the high-tech industries in general and for the electronic
components industry in particular. Personalcomputers, an
importantend use for many electronic components, pro-
vides an obvious example of a growing market for compo-
nents during the 1977 to 1987 period.
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Table 1 presents various measures of production and
costs for the electronics industries in several important
producingcountries, along with measures oftechnological
sophisticationforthose countries.'Thetable suggests that,
in 1988, the U.S. dominated the world's electronics indus-
try by most measures. The U.S. made 38 percent of the
world's electronic products. Japan and the European Com-
munity (Ee) also contributed significantly to world pro-
duction, with shares of 26 and 24 percent, respectively.
Thus, these three entities accounted for 88 percent of total
worldwide electronics production in 1988. Other pro-
ducers, including India, Taiwan, Singapore, Brazil, and
South Korea, together accounted foronly6.4percentofthe
world's electronics production.
The U.S. outranks other producing countries by most
l"Electronics" is defined here to include electronic materials and com-
ponents, software,computers,telecommunicationsequipment, business
equipment (copiers, fax machines, and so forth), and instruments.
measures of technological sophistication. The U.S. holds
commanding leads in terms of the number of telephones
per capita and the number of scientists and engineers. The
U.S. also ranks second (to Japan) in the number of scien-
tists and engineers relative to total population.
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita provides a
rough measure of the differences across countries in the
cost of doing business. Relatively high GDP per capita
reflects the high labor costs in those countries and also
suggests that the level of investment in both human and
physical capital is sufficient to generate relatively high
returns to land and other factors. By this measure, the U.S.
ranked second, at $18,393, with only Japan ($19,448)
posting a higher GDP per capita. Both the U.S. and Japan
have significantly higher GDP per capita than the EC's
$13,137, and none of the other producing countries listed
in Table 1has GDP per capitathat reaches evenhalf of the
U.S. or Japan levels.
There are signs, however, that the U.S. domination of
the industry may be waning. The growth rate in U.S.
production between 1984and 1988 was only 1percent, by
Table 1
Electronics Sectors in Selected Countries
u.s. Japan ECa S. Korea Thiwan Singapore Brazil India World
Value of Electronics Production ($M, 1988) 186,232 127,208 115,136 9,103 7,890 7,651 3,876 2,314 486,718
% of World Total (1988) 38.3 26.1 23.7 1.9 1.6 1.6 0.8 0.5 100
% of World Total (1984) 43.0 22.5 21.9 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.2 100
Real Annual Growth Rate (%, 1984-88) 8 6 24 15 23 11 23 4
Production/GDP (%, 1987) 3.9 4.6 2.6 6.0 10.0 28.6 1.0 1.7 N/A
Production ($OOO)/Employment 104.9 105.9 79.2 35.8 40.7 107.8 15.1 11.6 N/A
Total Electronics Employment (000, 1986) 1776 1201 1454 254 194 71 257 200 N/A
Annual Growth Rate (%, 1980-86) 1.3 9.6 1.5 9.8 2.6 -0.2 N/A N/A N/A
General Technology Characteristics
Telephones/1000Pop. (1986) 791 558 520 186 228 417 84 4 N/A
Scientists & Engineers (000, 1986) 787 575 468 47 42 2 33 100 N/A
Scientists & Engineers/Million Pop. 3,230 4,712 1,443 1,116 2,149 923 230 128 N/A
GDP per Capita ($, 1987) 18,393 19,448 13,137 2,881 3,794 7,654 2,304 326 N/A
Note: "Electronics" is defined here to include electronic materials and components, software, computers, telecommunications equipment,
business equipment (copiers, facsimile machines, and so on), and instruments.
aEC data exclude Portugal and Greece.
Federal Reserve BankofSan Francisco 27far the slowest growth among the group of countries
included in Table 1. Electronics industry growth rates in
countries that offer much lower costs were all in double
digits-stronger growth than in the countries that domi-
nated worldwide production in 1988. In addition, accord-
ing to the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), the
share of US. company production in total world semicon-
ductor production fell fairly steadily, from 65 percent in
1977, to 60 percent in 1982, 45 percent in 1987, and 38
percentin 1988(SIA 1990),beforepicking up slightlyto40
percent in 1990.2 It is likely that these numbers understate
the movement of semiconductor production outside of the
US., since US.-based companies have moved their own
production offshore even as foreign companies have in-
creased their production.
Thus, in some ways, the industry's patterns appear to be
consistent with the product life cycle hypothesis. The
U.S., a technology-oriented, high-cost country,dominated
the industry in its early days, suggesting that the US. was
the site of early innovations. Between 1984 and 1988, the
electronics industry grew fastest in the countries that
offered lower production costs. This change is consistent
with the industry moving towardthe standardization stage,
with firms seeking locations that offer lower costs.
Another characteristic that is broadly consistent with the
product life cycle theory is that, within the electronics
industry, the productmix varies substantially across coun-
tries. Korea, for example, specializes in computer assem-
bly, while Japan's electronics industry is dominated by
semiconductorfabrication. Differences in product mix and
capitalintensity arereflected in wide variations inthevalue
of production per worker across countries. In the US.,
Japan, and Singapore, the average value of production per
worker is $100,000. In sharpcontrast, the valueper worker
is $40,000 or less in India, Brazil, Taiwan, and South
Korea.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the US. doesretain
the worldlead in somesegments oftheelectronics industry.
US. producers dominate world production in highly prof-
itable areas, such as processors that are vital to the cal-
culating, graphics, and sound functions in computers.
Japanese producers, in contrast, dominate the less profita-
ble market for standard memory chips (Pollack 1992).
In a similar vein, Saxenian (1990) suggests that during
the middle and late 1980s, Silicon Valley spawned a new
generation of flexible, interconnected firms that specialize
in particular aspects of technological development or pro-
2Note that semiconductors are just one type of electronic component.
Semiconductors are a subset of the electronic components category
measured by SIC 367.
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duction. These firms do not attempt to make high-volume
commodity chips (asIntel andAdvanceMicro Devices had
in an earlier generation), but instead seek out small,
specialized niches in which they can take advantage of
their technological expertise and flexibility.
The view that US. producers continue to playan impor-
tant role in the high-tech industries, but not in mass-
produced commodity products, also is supported by the
pattern of employment growth within the US. Between
1977 and 1987, the number of electronic components
workers in nonproduction functions (including research
and development, headquarters functions, and marketing)
grew 88 percent. During the same period, the number of
production workersgrewbyarelatively modest 28percent.
These figures are consistent with a change in the US.
industry away from mass production and toward custom
products with smaller markets.
The overall picture that emerges is one of a veryhetero-
geneous industry, in which different countries havetended
to specialize in different functions, and there is still a role
for U.S. producers, although that role is different from its
role in the past. The productlife cycle theory is not strictly
applicable to a group of products as heterogeneous as this
one. The continued role ofUS.-basedfirms in developing
and implementing the new technologies, and the domi-
nance of the US., the EC, and Japan in total worldwide
production, suggests that the product life cycle story does
not fully capture the dynamics of the electronic compo-
nents industry. At the same time, though, the rapid growth
in assembly activity in Taiwan and South Korea is consis-
tent with .the product life cycle theory's assertion that
standardization allows production activities to move to
regions that offer relatively low costs, even though their
technological infrastructures are less well developed.
III. THE ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS INDUSTRY
IN THE U.S.
Malecki (1985) and Park and Lewis (1991) examined
whether the kinds of geographic changes predicted by the
product life cycle theory are at work in high technology
industries within the US. Malecki found that there was
little dispersal across four census regions between 1973
and 1983in the four 4-digit Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (SIC) categories he examined." Park and Lewis con-
ducted shift-share analysis using state-level data for three
of Malecki's four 4-digit industries, with mixed results.
3Those four industries were Electronic Computing Equipment (SIC
3573), Semiconductors (SIC 3674), Medical and Surgical Instruments
(SIC 3841), and Computer Programming (SIC 7372).
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product life cycle model.
Glasmeier (1986) disaggregated employment in 2-digit
SIC categories byoccupation.4 Shefoundthatthetechnical
and professional jobs were concentrated geographically,
but that many of the locations of these concentrations had
relatively few production workers in the same industry
groups. This supports theproduct lifecycle contentionthat
production and nonproduction activities tend to become
more separate as the product's life cycle progresses, al-
"These industries are Chemicals (SIC 28), Nonelectrical Machin-
ery (SIC 35),Electrical Machinery(SIC 36),Transportation Equipment
(SIC 37), and Scientific Instruments (SIC 38).
though the continued existence of a large cadre of non-
production workers suggests that production was not yet
fully standardized at the end of her sample period.
This section addresses these issues using Census of
Manufactures data for the 3-digit SIC industry of elec-
tronic components (367). (See Box for a description of the
data.) The present study differs from previous workin that
itexploresthequestion at the metropolitan arealevelrather
thanat thelevelof the state (ParkandLewis, Glasmeier) or
census region (Malecki).
Characteristics ofInnovating Regions
Table 2 presents information on various characteristics
of the ten Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) that
Box 1
Census ofManufactures Data
The manufacturing data in this study come from the
Census of Manufactures, produced by the US. Com-
merce Department. The Census of Manufactures pro-
vides metropolitan area data on such variables as
the number of production and nonproduction workers,
'workhours,and payroll costs. The Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) used for this study is electronic
components (SIC 367), which includes electron tubes,
printed circuit boards, semiconductors and related de-
vices, and electronic capacitors, resistors, coils, trans-
formers, and connectors. It does not include finished
technology products such as computers or scientific
instruments.
The number of Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs) for which complete data are available varies
among the sample years. Data are withheld for MSAs
with only a small number ofemployersin SIC 367, and
for MSAs in which a single employer dominated that
MSA'sindustry.Thedata setincludes 44 MSAs for1977
and 68 MSAs for 1987.
The MSAs for which complete data are reported
leave much ofthe US. employment in the industry un-
accounted for. For example, the 44 MSAs for which
1977 data are available account for only 49 percent of
US. employment in SIC 367. For1987, the samplesize
rises closer to 60 percent, but clearly a large portion of
the industry remains unreported. This large unreported
portion of the industry could potentially affect the
empirical results, if many of the industry's
Federal Reserve Bankof San Francisco
changesare occurring outside MSAs orin MSAs thatdo
not report complete data for SIC 367.
One problemwithusing SIC 367 isthat thecharacter-
istics of the products classified in this 3-digit SIC
category have changed over time. Between 1977 and
1987, the share of semiconductors in the total rose from
30.5 percent to 33.8 percent. The share of electronic
connectorsalso rose, and printed circuit boards were
added as a separate category in 1987. (Prior to 1987,
printed circuit boards were included in "Electronic
Components, not elsewhere classified.") During the
ten-year period, electronic capacitors, resistors, and
tubes became significantly less important to the entire
industry. While goingto the4-digit industry levelwould
alleviatemany of the problems associated with changes
.in the composition of SIC 367, too few MSAs report
4-digit data to allow a meaningful analysis.
Another potential problem with these data is that the
manufacturing census is conducted by establishment,
andanestablishment isconsidered to beinSIC 367only
if production occurs on the site. Therefore, an establish-
ment engaged only in research and development, sales,
administration, or other "auxiliary" functions would
notbe included in thetotals forSIC 367, evenif thefirm
produces nothing but electronic components. This
means that the data regarding production activities are
likelyto be more accurate than the data for nonproduc-
tion activities, although the extent of the problem with
nonproduction data is impossible to determine.
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Characteristics of Regions Producing Electronic Components, 1977
Per Capita Production Nonprod'n High 4+ Years
Percent of U.S. Employment Personal Worker Worker School of
SIC 367 Income Wage Salary Graduates- Collegea
MSA All Production Nonprod'n 'Iotal ($) ($/Hour) ($lYear) (%) (%)
San Jose,CA 10.1 8.1 14.4 0.7 8,865 5.41 19,850 79.5 26.4
Chicago,IL 5.4 5.7 4.8 3.7 8,885 4.63 15,855 67.5 18.5
Los Angeles/LongBeach, CA 5.2 5.7 4.2 3.9 8,473 4.78 19,163 69.8 18.5
Phoenix, AZ 4.1 3.0 6.6 0.6 7,059 5.02 14,053 75.0 18.3
Dallas/FortWorth, TX 3.7 3.8 3.7 1.4 7,878 5.49 15,233 70.0 20.2
Boston, MA 3.4 3.3 3.5 1.6 7,984 4.86 17,463 77.2 24.7
Anaheim/Santa Ana, CA 3.3 3.4 3.3 0.8 8,968 4.61 19,711 80.4 22.6
Nassau, NY 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.0 8,870 4.81 17,167 75.8 20.9
NewYork,NY 1.9 2.0 1.6 4.4 8,643 4.61 16,526 63.5 19.2
Philadelphia, PA 1.8 2.0 1.4 2.2 7,844 4.97 17,125 66.0 13.6
TenMSAs 41.1 39.0 45.7 20.3 8,426 4.97 17,640 72.5 20.3
U.S. 100 100 100 100 7,297 4.83 18,158 68.6 17.0
aEducationdata are for 1980.
accounted for the largest shares of U.S. electronic compo-
nents employment in 1977. Together, the top ten areas
accounted for41percent ofelectroniccomponents employ-
ment. By wayof comparison, these ten MSAs accounted
for about 20 percent of the nation's total employment
across all industries.
Of these tenMSAs, eight (San Jose,Chicago, Los An-
geles/Long Beach, Phoenix, Dallas/Fort Worth, Boston,
Anaheim, and Nassau) are much more strongly repre-
sented in the electronic components industry than their
sizes would suggest. In contrast, New York and Phila-
delphia are large metropolitan areas whose contributions
to the electronic components industry derive primarily
from their large sizes. Their contributions to electronic
components employment actually are smaller than their
contributions to total employment.
Theseten areas accounted forasignificantlylargershare
of the nation's nonproduction workers in the electronic
components industry than their share of production work-
ers. They contained 46 percent of the nation's nonpro-
duction workers in the electronic components industry,
but only 39 percent of national production workers. The
greater concentration among nonproduction workers than
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among production workers is due to sharp differences in
only two MSAs: San Jose and Phoenix. The other impor-
tant electronic components producing areas were either
proportionately represented byproduction and nonproduc-
tion workers, or were relatively over-represented by pro-
duction workers.
One of the most striking observations from this table
is that San Jose clearly dominated the industry. The San
Jose area, which accounted for only 0.7 percent of the na-
tion's total jobs in 1977, provided fully 11 percent of the
nation's electronic components employment. Moreover,
the San JoseMSA had more than twice as many electronic
components jobs as Chicago, which ranked second. San
Jose's share of the industry's nonproduction jobs was even
greater, at over 14 percent. These jobs, which cover
functions other than line production, include research and
development, sales, and headquarters functions. Thus,
nonproduction jobs are more likely to require advanced
education and technological training.
In most respects, the characteristics of the San Jose area
during the late 1970swere those that tend to be associated
with technological innovations. Stanford University, with
one of the nation's top electrical engineering programs, is
Economic Review / 1992, Number 2located in the area. The University of California at Berke-
ley, with anothertop-ratedelectrical engineering program,
is only about 50 miles away. Moreover, the San Jose area
boasts a highly educated population. Of residentsover 25
years old, 80 percent had high school diplomas and 26
percent had at least 4 years of college in 1980-much
higher proportions than the nation, where the figures
amongthesameage group were 69 percentand 17percent,
respectively.
The San Jose area had high costs by any measure. The
average hourly wage for production workers in the elec-
tronic components industry was $5.41 in San Jose, com-
pared with $4.83 nationally. The average annual salary for
a nonproduction worker in San Jose was $19,850, much
higher than the $18,158 national average. Per capita per-
sonal income, a more general measure of the level of
incomes (and presumably costs) in an area, also was
relatively high in the San Jose area, at $8,865 comparedto
a national average of $7,297. Housing prices are not listed
inthe table, buthome prices also were relatively high in the
SanJose area. 1980Census data, forexample, revealedthat
the median monthly mortgage payment for an owner-
occupieddwelling was$475 in San Jose, much higher than
the $365 national median. Rents in San Jose also were
much higher than the national average, with a median
monthly rental payment of $365, compared with the U.S.
median of $243.
Venture capital, an important source of funding for
high-tech start-upcompanies, also wasmore readily avail-
able in the San Jose area than in many other parts ofthe
country. While the New York/New Jersey/Connecticut
area clearly dominates the venture capitalfield with over a
third of the 100 biggest funds in 1986, Northern California
had 20 funds on the list, followed by the Boston area with
15("Venture Capital 100for 1986"). In fact, 73 ofthe 100
largest funds were located in these three areas alone, with
the remainder scattered throughout the rest of the United
States.
The overall picture of the San Jose area that emerges
is one of a quintessential innovating region. It clearly
dominated the industry early on, particularly in the non-
production areas that require highly educated, technical
personnel. The area was near universities with first-rate
electrical engineering programs, and had a highly edu-
cated population and relatively good access to venture
capital. Moreover, the high level of costs in the area, both
generally and in terms of labor for the electronic compo-
nents industry, suggests that if the industry were moving
toward standardization during the late 1970s and early
1980s, firms would have had an incentive to move their
operations to lower-cost regions.
Most of the other areas listed in Table2 had someof the
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characteristics of an innovating region. In particular, nine
out of ten had ahigherpercentageofcollege graduates than
the nation, and seven out often had a higher percentage of
high school graduates. But the characteristics of the other
MSAs are notas striking as those ofSan Jose. Forexample,
in or adjacent to each ofthese metropolitanareas there is at
least one university with an electrical engineering pro-
gram. However,the only top-20 programs in areas produc-
ing electronic components are in San Jose (Stanford), Los
Angeles/Long Beach (UCLA, USC, and Cal Tech), and
Boston (MIT).5 Nevertheless, most of the others havetop-
ranked electrical engineering departments within a few
hours' drive. Anaheim is adjacent to the Los Angeles area
and its universities. Princeton is within 50 miles of both
Philadelphia and New York. Similarly, Purdue and the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, both top-
ranked departments, are within 150 miles of Chicago.
Dallas/FortWorth is almost 200 miles from the University
of Texas at Austin. Among the most important metro-
politan areas for producing electronic components, only
Phoenix does not have a top-ranked electrical engineering
department within a few hundred miles.s
If there were an incentive to shift activity to lower-cost
regions since 1977, costs in these cities would be expected
to have been relatively high. Table 2 shows that, for these
ten cities as a group, labor costs in the electronic compo-
nents industry were only slightly higher than the national
average. Indeed, the average annual salary for nonproduc-
tion electronic component workers actually was lowerfor
these cities than it was nationally. San Jose is the only
metropolitanarea in this group with both production wages
and nonproduction salaries higher than the national aver-
age. In contrast, personal income per capita, a more
general measure of the MSA's level of costs, was substan-
tially higher in these areas than it was nationally. Taken
together, these figures suggest that, even if production and
nonproduction activities became less closely linked over
5According tothe author'scalculationsbased oninformationprovided by
the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils (1982), the top
twenty electrical engineering programs were: MIT (Cambridge, MA),
Stanford (Stanford, CA), Illinois (Urbana/Champaign, IL), California
(Berkeley, CA), UCLA (Los Angeles, CA), USC (Los Angeles, CA),
Purdue (West Lafayette, IN), Maryland (College Park, MD), Cornell
(Ithaca, NY), Carnegie-Mellon(Pittsburgh,PA),Ohio State (Columbus,
OR), Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI), Wisconsin (Madison, WI), Texas
(Austin, TX), Rensselaer (Albany, NY), Princeton (Princeton, NJ), Cal
Tech (Pasadena, CA), Florida (Gainesville, FL), UCSD (San Diego,
CA), and UCSB (Santa Barbara, CA).
6TheUniversityof Arizona, inTucson, is 34th ofthe 91ranked electrical
engineering departments; Arizona State in Tempe (a Phoenix suburb)
ranks 57th.
31time, as theproductlifecycle theory suggests, thepotential
cost savings from shifting electronic components activity
elsewhere may be relatively modest, except in the San Jose
area.
Around the late 1970s and early 1980s, the personal
computer became an important fixture in offices and
universities. With the huge growth in the industry,demand
forcomponentsincreasedenormously.Giventhese changes
in the industry, the characteristics of the regions that were
importantproducersofelectronic components in 1977, and
the discussionof thechanges that occur overaproduct'slife
cycle, we would expect to see a significant reduction in the
importance of the San Jose area over time. In contrast, we
would expect to see much less dramatic changes in the
patternsamong theothertechnology-oriented areaslisted in
Table 2.
Changes within the U.S.
Tosee whether such changes haveinfactoccurred, Table
3 provides similar data for the ten most important areas in
theindustryin 1987.7 Contrary toexpectationsbased onthe
product life cycle theory, San Jose's share of national
employment in the electronic components industry rose
from 10.1percentin1977to11.5percentin 1987.Moreover,
San Jose became more dominant in both theproductionand
nonproduction parts of the industry. The San Jose area
accounted for 14.4 percent of the nation's nonproduction
workers in 1977and 15.4percent in 1987;the area's shareof
total production workers rose from 8.1 percent to 9.0
percent during the same period.
Changes among the other producing cities also were
modest. One change is that the composition of the list
"Sinceeducationalattainmentdata wereavailableforonlyoneyear,the
figures in Table4 are identical to those in Table2.
Table 3
Characteristics of Regions Producing Electronic Components, 1987
Per Capita Production Nonprod'n High 4+ Years
Percent of U.S. Employment Personal Worker Worker School of
SIC 367 Income Wage Salary Craduates- Collegea
MSA All Production Nonprod'n 'Ibtal ($) ($/Hour) ($/Year) (%) (%)
San Jose, CA 1l.5 9.0 15.4 0.8 21,547 11.60 38,701 79.5 26.4
Los Angeles/LongBeach, CA 5.1 5.8 4.0 3.9 17,680 9.39 32,535 69.8 18.5
Phoenix, AZ 4.1 3.4 5.1 0.9 16,064 8.36 32,090 75.0 18.3
Anaheim/Santa Ana, CA 3.7 4.0 3.3 1.1 21,405 9.72 34,458 80.4 22.6
Boston, MA 3.5 3.4 3.6 1.7 20,330 9.44 31,936 77.2 24.7
Chicago,IL 3.1 3.6 2.3 3.0 17,662 8.19 30,360 67.5 18.5
Dallas/FortWorth, TX 2.9 2.8 3.2 1.8 16,998 9.91 39,406 70.0 20.2
Nassau, NY 2.2 2.3 2.1 1.1 22,139 8.82 34,311 75.8 20.9
San Diego, CA 1.8 1.9 1.6 0.8 16,658 8.98 36,1l4 78.0 20.9
Minneapolis, MN 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.3 18,205 9.20 36,087 79.9 21.9
TenMSAs 39.3 37.7 41.6 16.3 18,490 9.71 35,585 75.3 21.3
U.S. 100 100 100 100 l5,511 9.32 34,751 68.6 17.0
aEducationdata are for 1980.
32 Economic Review / 1992, Number 2varies slightly between the two years. In 1987, NewYork
and Philadelphia moved down to ranks 12and 11,respec-
tively, while San Diego and Minneapolis moved into the
top ten. Chicago fell from number 2 to number six, but
other changes in rank within the top ten were small.
Taken together, the top ten MSAs accounted for 39
percent of national employment in the electronic compo-
nents industry in 1987, down from 41percent in 1977.The
ten cities as a group also accounted for a smaller share of
nonproduction employment in 1987(42 percent) than they
did in 1977(46 percent). This change is consistent with the
notion that technological expertise might diffuse or be-
come less important as the product progresses through its
life cycle. The change in share for production workers,
however, was quite small, from 39 to 38 percent. This
small change tends to contradict the notion that firms are
moving production activities from their early centers to
other, lower-cost locations within the United States.
An additional prediction of the product life cycle theory
is that production and nonproduction activities become
less closely linked over time, as production processes
become more standardized. Toseewhetherthis patternhas
emerged within the U.S., I run simple correlations be-
tween each MSA's share of U.S. production and non-
production employment for each year, using the entire
sample of MSAs. 8 If the linkage between the two has
become weaker overtime,thecorrelation coefficientwould
shrink over time.
In 1977, the correlation coefficient between MSAs'
shares of national production employment in SIC 367 and
their shares of nonproduction employment was quite high,
at 0.914. In 1987, the correlation was even higher, at
0.927. These figures suggest that, within the U.S., the
linkage between production and nonproduction activities
remains strong. This result contradicts the expectations
based on the product life cycle theory.
The Census of Manufactures data run only through
1987,and data forSIC 367 are notavailableformostMSAs
for non-census years. However, many MSAs do report
intercensal data on SIC 36, electric and electronic equip-
ment, the 2-digit category that includes SIC 367.
ForMSAs in which SIC 36 data are available,theshares
of the top ten cities remained relatively stable from1977to
1987,followingthepattern seeninSIC367(seeAppendix).
Thesharedropped offsharplybetween 1987and 1991, from
34.6 percent to 24.6 percent. However, over half of the
drop-offin SIC 36between 1987and 1990occurred in Los
8Thesample includes 44 MSAs for 1977, and 68 MSAs for 1987.
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Angeles, falling from 8.9 percent to 3.5 percent. Since the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) does infactreport3-digit
data forSIC 367forLos Angeles, wecan checkto see if the
SIC 367 isresponsible forthesharpdecline inLos Angeles'
share of SIC 36 activity. The BLS numbers for SIC 367
reveal a much smaller decline in Los Angeles' share of
electronic components employment, from 4.5 percent to
3.9 percent. Thus, the evidence leaves open the possibility
that dramatic changes may have occurred in the electronic
components industry (SIC 367) sincethe 1987manufactur-
ing census, but the changes probably were not as dramatic
as the changes in SIC 36 were.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper started with the observation that many are
concerned about shifts in electronic components activity
awayfrom historical centers such as Silicon Valley. Such a
shift is consistent with the views of some economists who
argue that the factors affecting firms' location decisions
may vary during the course of a product's life cycle.
This study analyzed a variety of data atthe international
and national level. Consistent with previous work by
Malecki (1985) and Park and Lewis (1991), the analysis
found little evidence to support the contention that the
product life cycle theory explains changes in the location
of electronic components activity within the U.S. In par-
ticular, the San Jose metropolitan area, which includes
the Silicon Valley, continues to playadominant role in the
electronic components industry within the United States.
In contrast, an examination of the international data
revealed that the U.S. share of the total worldwide elec-
tronics market has fallen dramatically, and that nations
with lower costs and less developed technological in-
frastructures are gaining market share. This finding is
consistentwith expectations based ontheproduct lifecycle
theory. Nevertheless, the U.S. does continue to play an
important role in the industry, suggesting that complete
standardization of the industry either has not yet occurred




MSA Employment asa Percentage of National Employment
SIC 1977 1982 1987 1991
367 10.1 11.7 11.5
San Jose, CA 36 3.9 5.8 5.7 5.1
Chicago,IL
367 5.4 4.2 3.1
36 7.7 6.2 5.0 4.9
367 5.2 5.5 5.1
Los Angeles/Long Beach, CA 367 (BLS) 4.4 4.2 4.5 3.9
36 7.1 8.2 8.9 3.5
Phoenix, AZ 367 4.1 4.1 4.1
Dallas/Fort Worth, TX
367 3.7 3.5 2.9
36 2.8 3.3 4.2 3.7
Boston, MA
367 3.4 3.5 3.5
36 3.0 3.3 3.3 2.2
Anaheim/Santa Ana, CA
367 3.3 3.8 3.7
36 2.7 3.1 3.6 2.1
Nassau, NY 367 2.0 2.1 2.2
NewYork, NY
367 1.9 1.6 1.0
36 2.4 2.0 1.6 1.2
Philadelphia, PA
367 1.8 1.4 1.0
36 2.6 2.5 2.3 1.9
367 38.3 39.1 36.7
10MSA Average 36 30.3 32.2 31.4 21.4
Note: Unless noted otherwise, SIC 367 data are from the Census of Manufacturers. SIC 36 data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
and are not availablefor Phoenix or Nassau.
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